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 INTRODUCTION 
 Financing of the Luxembourg pension system is 
based on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and 
hence on an intergenerational contract. As is 
the case for most other European countries, this 
system will be exposed to the effects of 
demographic ageing over the coming decades. 
 The aim of this article is to develop a model 
that allows evaluating the effi ciency of a 
diversifi ed pension system fi nanced partly by 
a PAYG scheme and partly by capitalization. 
The effi ciency is measured by the long-term 
sustainability of the system. We compare the 
sustainability of our model with the one of 
a pure PAYG system. 
 We will proceed in three steps: 
 In a fi rst step, we highlight the evolution of 
salaries in Luxembourg. To this end, we use 
the recent statistical group-based trajectory model 
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of D. Nagin. 1 We estimate model parameters 
from a single database, provided by the general 
social security inspection offi ce (IGSS), containing 
annual salaries of all wage earners in the 
Luxembourg private sector. As a result, we 
divide the population into nine groups, each with 
its own mean salary trajectory in time and its 
relative weight in society. 
 In a second step, we evaluate the pension 
system by means of a new criterion. This is the 
sustainability coeffi cient, which we defi ne as 
the average amount (in euros) that the labour 
force has to earn to fund one euro of pension 
payments, based on current legislation. Our 
estimations show the high sensitivity of the 
coeffi cient to demographic variables and highlight 
the risks threatening the Luxembourg PAYG 
system. 
 To this aim, we develop a theoretical model 
consistent with our statistical analysis. This model 
allows for the determination of both the initial 
level and the evolution of the pensions for each 
of the groups identifi ed in the fi rst step of our 
work. Knowing the weight of each of the groups 
within the Luxembourg population, we are then 
able to evaluate the sustainability coeffi cient of 
the system. This corresponds to comparing the 
sum of all incomes of the labour force with that 
of all the pensions paid to pensioners at a given 
date while taking into account the growth rate 
of the population in time. 
 Finally, we interpret our results in the light of 
other sustainability criteria, such as the rate of 
contributions, which ensures long-term stability 
of the pension level under the current legislation 
or the pension level that current contributions 
are able to fi nance in the long run. 
 In the third and fi nal step, we analyse the 
impact of lump sum payments into the pension 
regime. Specifi cally, we consider a retirement 
savings plan fi nanced through a constant annuity 
and invested at a random interest rate. We then 
examine the problem of identifying optimal 
annuities for the nine groups previously 
identifi ed, and deduce the corresponding ratios 
between annuity and lump sum in each case. 
As before, our evaluation criterion is based on 
the amount of euros that have to be earned in 
order to guarantee fi nancing of a single euro of 
retirement payments, as well as the variance of 
that amount. However, this time, we take into 
account not only the collective fi nancing effort 
(through the PAYG regime), but also individual 
efforts (through savings towards lump sum 
payments) involving the savings plan. The new 
goal is then to manage the variation of the total 
effort under this new regime while making sure 
the sustainability coeffi cient is greater than it was 
within the previous system. Various results in 
terms of the ratio between PAYG and lump sum 
payments on the one hand and annuities on the 
other are obtained as a function of different levels 
of the sustainability coeffi cient chosen  a priori . 
 THE PENSION SYSTEM IN 
LUXEMBOURG 
 The statutory pension system in Luxembourg is 
composed of a general scheme for private sector 
employees and the non-salaried and of a special 
scheme for civil servants. The system includes 
old-age, invalidity and widowers ’ pensions. 
In what follows, only the general scheme will 
be considered and special interest will be paid to 
old-age pensions. 
 Funding for the general scheme is based on 
a PAYG system, which gets reviewed every 
7 years with the mandatory accumulation of 
a minimum reserve equal to 1.5 times the annual 
amount of benefi ts. The contribution rate is fi xed 
at the beginning of each period of coverage to 
ensure funding of the scheme throughout the 
period. The rate is 24 per cent of taxable payroll, 
split evenly between workers, employers and 
the state. A new period of coverage was initiated 
in 2006. The compensation reserve amounts to 
EUR 8046.4 million as of 31 December 2007 
and represents 3.42 times the amount of annual 
benefi ts. In what follows, we will ignore this 
reserve as it is a pure compensation reserve and 
must not be understood as a capital coverage 
guarantee of future benefi ts. 
 The net replacement rate after a full career 
in this regime is one of the highest in Europe: it 
reaches 96 per cent of average pre-retirement 
income for a worker on average earnings who 
has contributed for 40 years. 2 
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 ANALYSIS OF THE SALARY 
TRAJECTORIES 
 In order to evaluate the Luxembourg pension 
system, we need to determine the average 
trajectories of salaries in this country. To this 
end, we apply a recent method based on 
trajectories of development. We use an SAS 
procedure called Proc Traj to estimate model 
parameters from a database containing the annual 
salaries of all employees of the Luxembourg 
private sector. We thus obtain a regrouping of 
salary trajectories around common groupings. 
 A statistical method based on 
clustering 
 Longitudinal data form the empirical basis of 
research on various subjects in the social sciences 
and in medicine. The common statistical aim 
of these various application fi elds is the modelling 
of the evolution of an age- or time-based 
phenomenon. 3 Models and techniques such as 
the generalized mixed model assuming a normal 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, 4 latent 
growth curve modelling 5,6 and the nonparametric 
mixture model, based on a discrete distribution 
of heterogeneity, 7 emerged in the 1990s. We 
have retained the present variation of the 
generalized mixed model because of the growing 
interest in this approach in the context of 
questions about atypical subpopulations. 8 
 The nonparametric mixed model is also called 
a semiparametric mixture model 9 or latent class 
analysis for growth curves. 10 It is designed 
specifi cally to detect the presence of distinct 
subgroups among a set of trajectories and 
represents an interesting compromise between 
analyses centred on a single mean trajectory and 
case studies. 11 
 Similar to many time-varying economic data, 
incomes and pensions can be collected in 
longitudinal research designs if they are measured 
at constant time intervals. They can be part of 
hierarchical models where individuals belong to 
sub-groups themselves included in one or several 
groups. There are hence two aspects to pensions. 
On the one hand, the pension of an individual 
depends on their income trajectory (intra-group 
variability), but on the other it also depends on 
their profession, which links them to a part of 
society (inter-group variability). 
 Compared with subjective classifi cation 
methods, the nonparametric mixed model has 
the advantage of providing a formal framework 
to test for the existence of distinct groups of 
trajectories. This method does not assume  a priori 
that there is necessarily more than one group in 
the population. Rather, an adjustment index is 
used to determine the optimal number of 
subgroups. This is a signifi cant advance over 
other categorical methods that determine the 
number of groups only subjectively. 11 Moreover, 
this method allows to evaluate the accuracy 
of the assignment of individuals to different 
sub-groups and to consider the variation of this 
accuracy in subsequent analyses. 12 
 The SAS procedure Proc Traj, programmed 
by Daniel Nagin and Bobby Jones, is able to 
estimate the parameters of a semiparametric 
mixture model for longitudinal data that follow 
a normal (censored), a Poisson or a Bernoulli 
distribution. The subgroup trajectories can be 
modelled by polynomials of degree up to four. 
The procedure can calculate the posterior 
probability of group membership in terms of risk 
factors that are stable in time. Moreover, time-
dependent covariates can infl uence the trajectories 
and cause different effects in different subgroups. 
 Nagin ’ s nonparametric mixed model starts from 
a set of individual trajectories and tries to divide 
the population into a number of homogeneous 
sub-populations and to estimate a mean trajectory 
for each of these sub-populations. 
 Consider a statistical variable  Y defi ned on a 
population of size  N . Let  Y  i   =  y  i 1 ,  y  i 2 ,  … ,  y  iT  
denote a longitudinal sequence of measurements 
on individual  i over  T periods. 
 Let  P ( Y  i  ) denote the probability of  Y  i  . If  Y  i  is a 
counter variable,  P ( Y  i  ) is specifi ed as the Poisson 
distribution, for censored data it is specifi ed as the 
censored normal distribution, and for binary data it 
is specifi ed as the binary logit distribution. In our 
application, we assume that it follows a censored 
normal distribution. 
 The purpose of the analysis is to fi nd  r 
trajectories of a given type, in general polynomials 
of degree 4,  P ( t )  =   0  +   1 t  +   2 t 
2  +   3 t 
3  +   4 t 
4 . 
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 Let  P   j  ( Y  i  ) denote the probability of obtaining 
the observed data for individual  i given 
membership in group  j and    j  the probability of 
an individual chosen at random to belong to the 
group number  j . Hence,    j  is the size of group  j . 
 We try to estimate a set of parameters  
  =  {  0 
 j  ,   1 
 j  ,   2 
 j   ,   3 
 j  ,   4 
 j  ,    j  ;  j  =  1,  … ,  r }, which 
maximizes the probability of  Y  i  . The optimal 
number of groups  r is also an outcome of the 
analysis. For a given group, conditional 
independence is assumed for the sequential 
realizations of the elements of  Y  i  ,  y  it  , over 
the  T periods of measurement. The likelihood  L 
of the sample is then given by 
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 where   denotes the density function of the 
standard normal distribution. These equations are 
too complicated to hope to obtain an algebraic 
solution. Bobby L. Jones (Carnegie Mellon 
University) has programmed an SAS procedure 
based on a quasi-Newtonian maximum search 
procedure. 13 The estimated standard deviations 
are obtained by inverting the observed 
information matrix. 
 One problem is that numerical estimates of 
probabilities of group membership    j  must be 
contained between 0 and 1. This is a diffi cult 
constraint when using iterative approximation 
procedures. Hence, the problem is circumvented 
by setting 
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 where the    j  are real parameters. As the sum of 
all the    j  is equal to 1, it suffi ces to estimate  r  −  1 
parameters    j  . By convention, we set   1  =  0. 
 The fi nal form of the likelihood is hence equal to 
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 A hard part of the problem is selecting the 
right model, in particular the optimal number of 
trajectory groups. One possible strategy is to 
use the likelihood ratio test. Unfortunately, the 
null hypothesis of this test is on the boundary 
of the parameter space, which invalidates 
the asymptotic results. 14 Because of this, the 
mathematical criterion generally used is the 
Bayesian Information Criterion BIC defi ned by 
BIC L k N= −log( ) , log( )0 5
 
 where  k denotes the number of parameters in the 
model. The difference of the BIC between two 
models can then be used as an approximation 
of the logarithm of the Bayes factor. 15 Keribin 16 
shows that, under certain conditions, this 
approximation is valid to test for the number 
of components in a mixture model. Finally, we 
choose the model with the highest BIC, meaning 
the one with the BIC closest to zero. 
 Nagin ’ s model also allows determining which 
group a given individual belongs to. The 
posterior probability P( j / Y  i  ) for an individual  i to 
belong to group number  j is indeed given by the 
Bayes theorem: 
P j Y
P Y j
P Y j
i
i j
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=
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p
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 A large posterior probability estimate for a 
small group requires that  Y  i  be so strongly 
consistent with the small group that  P ( Y  i  / j  ) for 
that group is very large in comparison to its 
companion probabilities for the big groups 
(Nagin, 2005). 
 The IGSS database 
 The analysis is based on a fi le containing the 
salaries of all employees of the Luxembourg 
private sector. The data cover the period from 
1940 to 2006. As the fi le documents the careers 
of people who joined the workforce from the 
beginning of the 1940s onwards, it is not 
complete during the fi rst years, but becomes so 
gradually. In particular, it includes all the 
employees of the Luxembourg private sector 
from the beginning of the 1980s until 2006. 
 This fi le originates from the IGSS. The main 
variables are the net annual taxable salary, 
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measured in constant (2006 equivalent) euros, 
gender, age at fi rst employment, residence and 
nationality (Luxembourg national living in 
Luxembourg, foreigner living in Luxembourg or 
people working in Luxembourg but ordinarily 
resident in a neighbouring country) and the type 
of employment contract (blue- or white-collar 
worker). 
 Initially, the fi le consisted of about 7  000  000 
lines showing the salaries of some 718  054 
workers. Each line gave the annualized salary 
of a worker. We converted the initial fi le into 
a fi le with 718  054 lines with the wages from 
1940 to 2006 as variables. Most lines contained 
many zeros as no individuals worked 
continuously from 1940 to 2006. In addition, 
many careers are incomplete for many reasons. 
Moreover, for immigrant workers, the data only 
document the part of their careers spent in 
Luxembourg and there is no information about 
work done in their country of origin. Finally, 
the percentage of employees who quit 
prematurely, whether on a disability pension or 
through pre-retirement or even for family reasons 
(for example, women stopping work or 
interrupting their work to look after their 
children) is around 50 per cent. 
 Domestic employment (which includes foreign 
residents working in Luxembourg) has 
experienced strong growth since the mid-1980s, 
with an average increase of 3.5 per cent annually 
and an increase of more than 110  000 jobs 
between 1986 and 2001 (compared with 20  000 
jobs in the period 1975-1985) ( Source : STATEC). 
The development of the fi nancial marketplace 
and the growing needs of the public sector have 
been key drivers of this evolution. Today, the 
services sector represents more than three quarters 
of total employment. These changes are not 
without consequences in terms of professional 
status, such that typical career progressions up to 
the 1980s are necessarily signifi cantly different 
from those of the last 25 years. 
 We have therefore decided to focus on careers 
of individuals who began working in Luxembourg 
between 1982 and 1986 and who have worked 
for at least 20 years. Using macros programmed 
in Mathematica, we selected persons who meet 
these criteria. In our fi le were 487  052 persons 
who started to work in Luxembourg from 1982 
onwards. The fi nal database used for our analysis 
includes data covering 22  203 private sector 
employees and workers: this is the full population 
of individuals who started work after 1982 and 
who have worked in the private sector for at 
least 20 years. We note that, in Luxembourg, 
the maximum contribution ceiling on pension 
insurance is fi ve times the minimum wage, or 
 S 7577 (2006 equivalent euros) per month. Wages 
in our data are thus also capped at that number. 
 The mean salary trajectories in 
Luxembourg 
 We used the SAS procedure Proc Traj, 
programmed by Daniel Nagin and Bobby Jones, 
to determine the mean salary trajectories of 22  203 
people who began working in the Luxembourg 
private sector between 1982 and 1987 and who 
kept working for at least 20 years. 
 We established the trajectories for models with 
between 4 and 20 groups. As the salary 
trajectories form more or less a continuum in the 
continuous functions with domain [1000, 4000] 
and range [1200, 7577], the BIC adjustment 
criterion for determining the optimal number of 
groups is not well suited. Indeed, BIC increases 
with the number of groups. This is quite normal, 
as it just shows that if one assumes more groups 
one can necessarily represent reality with more 
details. On the other hand, a larger number of 
groups implies the resulting groups are smaller 
and the explanatory model more complicated to 
use. After discussion with the IGSS, we decided 
to retain a nine-group solution, as it gives 
a good representation of career development in 
Luxembourg. Solutions with more groups add 
essentially parallel paths to those present in our 
model. 
 To test the stability of trajectories in time, we 
also established trajectories for the fi rst 15 years 
of different working lives (careers starting 
between 1985 and 1992) and for full careers of 
40 years (careers starting between 1960 and 
1967). The trajectories of the fi rst 15 years are 
very close to the fi rst 15 years of trajectories for 
20-year careers. The sizes of the groups vary 
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between 2 and 6 per cent compared with the 
ones we found and the changes are due to gains 
or losses to groups with similar salaries. As 
moreover the macroeconomic situation has not 
changed dramatically during the last 20 years, we 
are fairly confi dent that the trajectories remain 
valid, except in cases of severe economic shocks 
that could certainly change the situation 
completely. The only thing that might change 
over the coming years is the percentage of 
foreign resident workers in the different groups. 
As the total number of employees increases faster 
than the population does, this percentage will 
continue to grow in all groups. The trajectories 
for full careers are also quite similar to ours, 
except that they show a clear wage decline 
during the steel crisis for the trajectories 
representing high wages. 
 Figure 1 shows the average salary trajectories 
across our nine groups. 
 THE PENSION MODEL 
 In a general context where both the numbers 
of contributors and pensioners vary signifi cantly, 
it is important to develop a model to estimate 
the urgency and effectiveness of reforms of the 
Luxembourg pension system. 
 This model must allow for the identifi cation 
of both roles and dependencies of all system 
parameters: duration and rates of contribution, 
life expectancy, demographic changes, 
replacement ratios, saving rates and so on. At 
the same time, it must also allow for a faithful 
representation of these variables and of the links 
between them. Finally, it must be as simple 
and realistic as possible. 
 To meet these requirements, we have calibrated 
wage trajectories using the Proc Traj procedure in 
SAS. We then formulate assumptions concerning 
the evolution of relevant variables of the model. 
 Using the salary trajectories 
 By highlighting nine salary paths and being able to 
assign to each a weight that refl ects the proportion 
of society that it represents, we obtain a tool that 
is both stable in time (as it is based on 20 years of 
wage data) and independent of any individual 
approach, as the trajectories are collective. We can 
then get mean results, obtain a measure of 
dispersion or dynamically analyse situations while 
retaining the possibility of incorporating new 
parameters. 
 The sizes of the different groups as a 
percentage of the total population are shown 
in  Table 1 . 
 The nine curves highlight nine average rates of 
wage growth    i  ,  i  =  1,  … ,  9. Each    i  is determined 
from the trajectory  y  i   =  P  i  ( t ). If   i is the slope of 
 Figure 1 :   Average salary curves across the nine groups. 
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the least squares line through the cloud of points 
( t , ln  P  i  ( t )), then    i   =  exp(   i  )  −  1 ( Table 2 ). 
 Model assumptions 
 Each salary curve models the evolution of a 
proportion  p  i  of the workforce. This evolution is 
characterized by a growth rate    i  and leads to a 
pension trajectory for a proportion  p  i  of retirees. 
Assume that  p  i   =  p  i  and that all pension curves 
grow by  r per cent every year (in reality, the 
government decides on the adjustment every 
2 years). 
 The population size (active and retired) 
changes each year to keep pace with the 
demographic intergenerational rate  d (for details 
on this rate, see  Box 1 ). It consists of individuals 
who, after working for  T years, have a life 
expectancy of  S years at retirement. 
 We will assume that  T  =  40,  S  =  20 and  
d follows a uniform law on the interval 
[0 per cent, 4 per cent]. 
 At any time  t , there are  n  i  individuals who 
started working  i years before  t . This leads to a 
cloud of points ( i ,  ln( n  i  )), which is fi tted by the 
regression line ln( n  i  )  =  a  +  bi . 
 Under these assumptions, the number of 
pensioners per 100 contributors, called the load 
factor, depends explicitly on  d as shown in 
 Figure 2 . 
 If  d is very close to 0, there are about two 
times more active workers than retirees; if  d is of 
the order of 4 per cent, there are seven times 
more. Note, however, that the variations of  d 
can be only gradual. Indeed, each estimate of  d 
is a snapshot of a society in which 60 years 
separate individuals newly entering the workforce 
from retirees dying of old age. 
 Each year, the number of people joining the 
workforce changes but the population structure 
over the remaining 59 years remains the same: 
the previous year ’ s starters are now one year into 
their careers, the people they replace now have 
2 years of work experience and so on. After 
20 years, two-thirds of the workforce are still 
individuals present at the start unless one accepts 
the idea of signifi cant variability between years 
(through major variations in mortality over time, 
foreign employees returning to their native 
country and so on) ( Figure 3 ). 
 Studying the method of fi nancing a pension 
plan is tantamount to link within a given 
equilibrium the infl ows of contributions and the 
outfl ows of benefi ts. Historically, Luxembourg 
has followed a PAYG policy. This is not a pure 
PAYG policy as a reserve has been accumulated 
 Table 1 :  Group sizes 
 Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
 p 1 =13.4 %  p 2 =16.9 %  p 3 =20.8 %  p 4 =7.9 %  p 5 =14.9 % 
 Group 6  Group 7  Group 8  Group 9  
 p 6 =4.8 %  p 7 =6.6 %  p 8 =8.4 %  p 9 =6.4 %  
 Table 2 :  Wage growths in the nine groups 
 Curve 1  Curve 2  Curve 3  Curve 4  Curve 5 
  1 =3.07 %   2 =0.96 %   3 =1.45 %   4 =2.82 %   5 =0.19 % 
 Curve 6  Curve 7  Curve 8  Curve 9  
  6 =2.58 %   7 =1.28 %   8 =0.48 %   9 =1.09 %  
Box 1:  Evolution of the demographic intergenerational rate 
 Writing  
N a
d b
0
1
=
= − −
exp( )
exp( )
 gives the best approximation of the real population 
( n 0 ,  … ,  n  T  +  S ) by the model population ( N 0 ,  … .,  N  T  +  S  ). 
 We defi ne the number  d by  
N
N
di j
=
+
0
1( )
  d is then directly linked to the active structure of 
the country and seems to be strongly correlated to 
economic indicators such as the GDP. 
 Figure 2 :   Load factor for old-age pension recipients. 
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in recent years. However, we do not take this 
into account in our reasoning, since all existing 
studies (by the International Labor Offi ce in 
Geneva, the Luxembourg Central Bank and 
the General Inspectorate of Social Security) claim 
that the money invested will be insuffi cient to 
ensure the sustainability of the system. They 
predict, under conventional economic growth 
assumptions, that the system will have used up 
all reserves within the coming 30 years. 
 Analysis of the PAYG system 
 As part of our work, we have developed a new 
indicator of sustainability for PAYG pension 
regimes: the sustainability coeffi cient   1 . We have 
additionally evaluated   1 for the part of the 
Luxembourg system that is based on PAYG policy, 
taking into account a mean intergenerational 
population growth between 0 and 4 per cent. 
 Defi nition of the sustainability coeffi cient 
 The principle of distribution currently prevailing 
in the Grand Duchy is a principle of solidarity 
between generations. The pensions paid to 
retirees are directly fi nanced by contributions 
levied on earnings. With this type of approach, it 
is essential to assess the regime ’ s ability to meet 
the payments to future pensioners. To this end, 
cash fl ows generated by the contributors must at 
all times be compared with those paid to retirees. 
The sustainability coeffi cient is a criterion that 
supports this comparison. 
 By defi nition, the sustainability coeffi cient  
 1 of a PAYG system is the sum of all salaries 
earned by active workers, divided by the sum 
of all pensions paid to retirees at time  t . For 
every euro of pension,   1 euros are earned in 
salary. Moreover,   1 is a random variable whose 
values depend on the demographic structure of 
the country at time  t . 
 Evaluation of   1 as a function of  d 
 Under our assumptions, the workforce is changing 
year after year of length of service at a rate of 
mean intergenerational population growth  d 
between 0 and 4 per cent. The SAS procedure 
Proc Traj allows us to estimate the average wage 
 S  i  of an active individual with  i years of career 
experience and the average pension  P  j  of a retiree 
who began working  j years ago. We infer the sum 
of all wages paid at time  T : 
N N S
N S
da
T
T= + + +0 0
0
1

( )
 
 The calculation of  d for the year 1998, for 
example, leads to  d  =  3.4 per cent. 
 In general, the contributors that we have 
followed over time using the IGSS database 
benefi t from an old-age pension. It is therefore 
assumed for the area of old-age pension insurance 
that population growth corresponds to that of the 
active workforce. To take account of other 
pension plans, we introduce a multiplier  k which 
can be used to calculate the sum of all pensions 
granted on the date  T : 
N
kN
d
P
kN
d
Pp T T T S T S= +
+ +
++ + + +
0
1 1
0
1 1( ) ( )

 
 As said above,  k is a new parameter of the 
problem, which we assume constant for 
simplicity. Its estimation using data in our 
possession gives the average value  k  =  2. 
 We can then see that   1 is an increasing 
function of  d . The higher the rate of population 
growth, the more sustainable the pension 
system. 
t1
1 1 1
0 1
1
= =
+ +
+ +
+ + + +
+
+ +N
N
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S
p
a
k
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k
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S
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 Figure 3 :   Variation of the  k coeffi cient between 1990 and 
1998. 
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 It is easy to see that, approximately,  E (  1 )  =  2 
and   (  1 )  =  0.8. On average, an employee 
has to earn 2  S for each euro of pension paid 
( Figure 4 ). 
 The value of the coeffi cient of variation (that 
is, the ratio of standard deviation to mean) 
CV ( )
.
%t1
0 8
2
40= =
 
 shows that the dispersion around this mean is 
important. 
 This is confi rmed by the graph above. From a 
situation in which the rate of population growth 
is low to one where it is high, the number of 
euros that have to be earned by contributors to 
fund every dollar of retirement is multiplied by 3. 
This large variability in   1 is evidence of danger 
to the pension system. Whereas fi nancing a euro 
pension is easy when  d is large, the same task 
quickly becomes unmanageable when  d is low. In 
particular, when  d falls below 1 per cent,   1 
approaches the value unity and equilibrium 
becomes almost impossible to maintain. 
 The rate of pension contributions in 
Luxembourg is currently set at 24 per cent of 
taxable earnings; this charge is divided into three 
equal parts of 8 per cent between the state, 
employees and employers. 
 Figure 5 , drawn using the value  k  =  2, shows 
that, for a fi xed horizon to 2040 and an average 
intergenerational growth rate of 3 per cent 
(which is our baseline fi gure calculated in 1998), 
the equilibrium between wages earned and 
pensions requires a rate of contribution of 
40 per cent! (To represent the future horizon, 
we extrapolate salaries earned since the 1980s 
over 20  +  20  =  40 years to guarantee that all 
individuals can be certain of being paid 
throughout retirement.) 
 Another way to see the problem is that if the 
contribution rate  c 1 necessary for equilibrium is 
greater than that required by law ( C 0  =  24 per 
cent), then we must reduce benefi ts by a factor 
of   so as to obtain a ratio of pension fl ows to 
wages such that: 
P P et
P
S
c1 0
1
0= =g   
 
 Thus, we fi nd: 
g
g g
P
S
c c c
c
c
0
0 1 0
0
1
= ⇔ = ⇔ =
 
 With the same assumptions ( k  =  2,  d  =  3 per 
cent,  c 0  =  24 per cent), the reduction   of 
pensions that would recover an equilibrium of 
the fl ows is 40 per cent ( Figure 6 ). 
 Thus, although the system is well managed, 
it contains signifi cant risk. With an uncertain 
number of contributors and an infl ux of new 
rightholders, the PAYG system could at some 
stage become less favourable than today. Faced 
with this situation, what to say to people tempted 
to improve their pension? It may be possible 
to save up individually, but how can one in 
that case determine what proportion should be 
capitalized? 
0%
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 Figure 5 :   Rate of pension contributions as a function of  d . 
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 Figure 4 :   Sustainability coeffi cient as a function of the 
demographic rate d. 
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 A LESS RISKY APPROACH: 
MIXTURE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO 
AND CAPITALIZATION 
 As for the pay-as-you-go system, we defi ne a 
sustainability coeffi cient. This coeffi cient depends 
on the rate of return of the capital market and 
the annuity. Then we consider an overall 
sustainability coeffi cient, characteristic of a mixed 
system where  x per cent of the pensions are 
fi nanced by a pay-as-you-go system and (1  −  x ) 
per cent by lump sum payments. This allows us 
to assess the gains of sustainability achieved with 
a mixed system compared with a pure PAYG 
system. 
 Defi nition of the sustainability 
coeffi cient of the funded system  
 In an approach combining the overall effort 
of sharing with a personal effort of funding, 
every euro of a pension is earned partly by 
the collective work of the labour force and 
partly by the individual savings of the future 
pensioner. Consider the time  T when an 
individual  I  j  , which belongs to the  j th group 
of salaries highlighted above, is retiring. 
 We have seen that if   1 euros earned by the 
active workers generate one euro of pension at 
that time of retirement,   1 is the sustainability 
coeffi cient of the PAYG system. 
 Symmetrically, if   2 euros earned by  I  j  
generate one euro of pension,   2 is the 
sustainability coeffi cient of the funded system. 
By defi nition, the sustainability coeffi cient   2 
of the funded system is the total sum earned by 
the individual during his period of activity 
divided by the sum of all the pensions that are 
paid to him thanks to the savings that he has 
accumulated. 
 Consider the case where the wages  S  j  of  I  j  in 
 t  =  1 is increasing by the annual rate    j  . If he 
decides to save each a sum of  a  j  EUR invested at 
the market rate  i , the sustainability coeffi cient of 
his funded system is given by 
t
l l
2
1 2 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
=
+ + + + + + +
+ + +
− − −
−
S i S i S
a i a
j
T
j
T
j j j
T
j
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
 j
j
j j
T
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i
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 For the funded system, the amount of the 
savings depends of course upon the rate of return 
 i of the investments.  Figure 7 illustrates this 
dependence for group 1. 
 In all the groups,   2 is a decreasing function 
of  I because if the market rate is higher less 
money is needed to ensure one euro of 
pension. 
 The computation of   2 shows that  E (  2 ) and 
Var(  2 ) are inversely proportional to the annuity 
 a  j  and its square  a  j  
2 , respectively: 
E
c
a
Var
K
a
j
j
( )
( )
t
t
2
2 2
=
=
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 Figure 7 :   Sustainability coeffi cient of the funded system 
as a function of the market rate  i . 
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 Figure 6 :   Fall of the replacement rate as a function of  d . 
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 Defi nition of the overall sustainability 
coeffi cient 
 Generally speaking, for every euro of pension, a 
proportion  x may be due to the unfunded system 
and a proportion (1  −  x ) by the funded one. The 
more an individual has privately invested the 
smaller is  x . Today, in most cases in Luxembourg 
 x  =  100 per cent  =  1, because Luxembourg has a 
pure PAYG system. The main advantage of this 
situation is a full immunization against interest rate 
risk, whereas its main disadvantage is its extreme 
dependence on the demographic risk. In contrast, 
a situation where we have  x  =  0 per cent would 
present an extreme dependence on the interest rate 
risk and complete immunization against 
demographic risk. 
 By defi nition, the overall sustainability coeffi cient 
  ( x ) is the number of euros needed to get a pension 
where  x euro are derived from the PAYG system 
and (1  −  x ) euros by lump sum payments. 
t t t( ) ( ) , [ , ]x x x x= + − ∈1 21 0 1 
 
 if we assume that   1 and   2 are independent,   ( x ) 
is a random variable with expectation  E [  ( x )]  =  x
E (  1 )  +  (1  −  x ) E (  2 ) and variance Var[  ( x )]  =  
 x 2 Var(  1 )  +  (1  −  x )
2Var(  2
 ). 
 The sustainability of the system 
 Building a mixed pension system based both on a 
funded and an unfunded part means diversifying 
the options and the risks if one adopts a portfolio 
management logic. Lump sum payments allow to 
protect itself against from demographic risk 
(decrease of the active workforce, increased 
lifespan of the retirees, and so on), whereas the 
PAYG system allows to protect itself against 
infl ation and the volatility of fi nancial markets. 
 Moving from a PAYG system to a mixed 
system forces the active workers to give up a part 
of their consumption as they have to pay an 
annuity  a to a retirement saving plan. By saving 
a part of their income, they get a higher pension 
level and they have a better control of the 
variability of their future earnings, but they do 
not benefi t immediately from this sum. 
 We hypothesize here that the effort associated 
with this renouncement must be as small as 
possible. This means that the utility  U  =  U ( a ) has 
to be a decreasing function of a: 
′U a( ) 0
 
 To highlight the benefi ts of diversifi cation, we 
fi x a threshold value for the gain of sustainability 
 
G x
Var Var x
Var
G( )
( ) ( )
( )
*
=
− [ ]t t
t
1
1

 
 and seek the optimal split  x  =  x * , which 
maximizes the utility function  U  =  U ( a ). 
 Thus, the effort to control the risk of 
variability with respect to a pure PAYG situation 
is measured by  G * . 
 To fi x the ideas, consider an individual  I 
belonging to group 1 who has already achieved to 
save 2000 euros. Its share  x related to the unfunded 
system in the calculation of the sustainability 
coeffi cient T( x ) depends of course on the evolution 
of the market rate during its period of activity. The 
higher is the market rate, the smaller the value of  x 
needs to be. This value is not known in advance. 
However, it is possible to assess the variability of 
  ( x ) according to the different possible values of  x . 
We show that the points ( x , Var[ T ( x )]) lie on a 
parabola with summit (0.83, 0.56) (see below). 
This means that the minimum variability that  I can 
hope for is 0.56 and that it is obtained for  x  =  83 
per cent. If  I want to reduce this variability even 
more and get for instance Var[T( x )]  =  0.5,  Figure 8 
shows that he has to save more than his current 
2000 euros! 
 (1) 
 Figure 8 :   Variability of the sustainability coeffi cient as a 
function of  x for a saving annuity of 2000 S . 
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 One can show that the minimal effort to achieve 
this goal is saving annuity  a  =  2650 euros ( Figure 9 ). 
 Let us write the formal demonstration of these 
results. 
 Assume that the individual belongs to group  j . 
Let 
K Var
S
i
i
i
j
j
T
j
T
T=
−
+ − +
+ −
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
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( ) ( )
( )1
1 1
1 1l
l
 
 Inequality (1) implies that 
Var x G Vart t( ) ( ) ( )*[ ] − 1 1
 
 hence 
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 as the minimum of the expression is obtained 
for 
x
K
K a Var
  =
+ 2 1( )t
 
 Geometrically, this means that the parabola (P) 
of equation 
y K a Var x a KxVar G K= + − − − +( ( )) ( ) ( )*2 1
2 2
12 1t t   
 
 cuts the (Ox) axis only if its summit is lying 
below (Ox). 
 Thus, 
a
G K
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 and  U ( a ) is maximum when 
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 Under these circumstances, necessarily (2) is an 
equality and 
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 Figure 9 :   Variability of the sustainability coeffi cient as a 
function of  x for a saving annuity of 2650 S . 
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 Conclusion: The optimal annuity 
 Let us summarize our results. 
 Assume that the utility function of an active 
worker  U  =  U ( a ) is a decreasing function of  a . 
 The unfunded system part  x  =  x * for which the 
utility  U is maximal under the constraint of 
sustainability 
G x
Var Var x
Var
G( )
( ) [ ( )]
( )
*
=
−t t
t
1
1

 
 is obtained for  x *  =  1  −  G * and requires that the 
individual has a retirement plan fi nanced through 
a constant annuity 
a
G K
Var G
*
*
*( )( )
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−t1 1
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 depends on the salary trajectory. 
 For these values  a * and  x * , the gains in 
sustainability with respect to two situations of a pure 
unfunded, respectively, a pure funded system are 
G
Var Var x
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* ( ) ( )
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− [ ]t t
t
1
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 A person wishing to divide by two the 
variability of the PAYG sustainability coeffi cient 
has to pay annuities at least as high as the ones 
given in Table 3: 
 Consider again the example of an individual 
belonging to group 1 who has already saved 
EUR 2000. His overall sustainability coeffi cient 
is already less volatile than his PAYG 
sustainability coeffi cient would have been: 
Var[  ( x )]    Var(  1 )  =  0.68. However, if he wants 
to further reduce the volatility and achieve 
a variance Var [  ( x )]  =  0.34 to divide by two 
his initial coeffi cient,  Table 3 shows that he 
cannot maintain his current annuity of 2000 
euros but should at least save EUR 4466 
every year. 
 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS  
 Our results allow a simple description of the 
pure unfunded or funded systems. In the fi rst 
case (pure PAYG), the concept of group does 
not matter because the effort is collective, each 
generation of active workers in each group 
agreeing to fi nance the pensions of their elders, 
whatever their affi liation. The sustainability of 
the system only depends on the demographic 
rate  d . It is shown that if  d varies between 0 and 
4 per cent, the workers in Luxembourg have to 
earn on average two euros for every euro of 
pension paid ( Table 4 ). 
 In a pure funded system, however, group 
membership is important. The results show that 
the exposure to the sustainability risk is not the 
same for every group. In particular, groups with 
a very fl at salary trajectory (especially groups 5 
and 8) are less exposed to changes ( Table 5 ). 
 Table 3 :  Minimal annuity by group allowing to divide by two the 
variability of the sustainability coeffi cient  
 Group  G1  G2  G3  G4  G5  G6  G7  G8  G9 
 Annuity  S 4466  S 713  S 1448  S 5231  S 220  S 6364  S 2809  S 743  S 3140 
 Table 4 :   Sustainability index as a function of the population 
growth 
 d  Sustainability index 
 0  1.02 
 0.01  1.36 
 0.02  1.82 
 0.03  2.45 
 0.04  3.33 
 Mean  2.00 
 Variance  0.67 
 Standard deviation  0.82 
 Table 5 :  Variability of the sustainability index for the different 
groups  
 Group  G1  G2  G3  G4  G5  G6  G7  G8  G9 
 Variation ( % )  9.7  2.9  4.4  8.9  0.6  8.1  3.9  1.4  3.3 
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 In contrast, for any annuity, lump sum 
payment always accentuates the volatility risk 
for dynamic progressions. Thus, individuals 
with a high wage growth are less protected 
(groups 1, 4 and 6). 
 During the transition from a pure PAYG to 
a mixed system, one can hence expect that 
gains in sustainability are particularly visible for 
the less dynamic salary curves. However, these 
are not the only groups to profi t from a system 
change.  Table 6 shows that if the annuity of an 
individual is at least 10 per cent of its average 
salary, he gains at least 50 per cent in his 
sustainability coeffi cient, regardless of the group 
he belongs to. 
 An analysis of the situation highlights the role 
played by the number 
K Var
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 The higher this number, the larger the annuity 
must to achieve a gain of sustainability  G * of 
50 per cent. More precisely, we need 
a
K
Var
*
( )

t1
 
 Under these conditions and only under these 
conditions, the variability of the funded system is 
smaller than the one of the PAYG system. 
 The value of  G * also determines the value of 
the part  x * , which goes into a funded system in 
the case of a mixed system. It is given in  Table 7 
for a gain  G * of 50 per cent. 
 As predicted by the theory  x *  =  1  −  G * 
and therefore the part of the PAYG system 
decreases gradually with the increasing of the 
funded part. 
 In general, the choice of  G * allows to compute 
the optimal annuity for each group. Obviously, 
 Table 6 :  Gain in sustainability for the different groups 
 Group  G1  G2  G3  G4  G5  G6  G7  G8  G9 
 Gain in 
Sustainability ( % )
 51.7  90.2  80.7  55.3  99.6  59.2  84.2  97.3  87.7 
 Table 7 :  Optimal repartition percentage for the different 
groups 
 Group  G1  G2  G3  G4  G5  G6  G7  G8  G9 
 Repartition ( % )  48.3  9.8  19.3  44.7  0.4  40.8  15.8  2.7  12.3 
 Figure 10 :   Gains in sustainability as a function of the saving annuity for group 9. 
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for every group a higher annuity implies a higher 
sustainability. 
 There is a gain both for the funded and the 
unfunded system but never conjointly. If one 
system is gaining, the other is of course losing 
( Figure 10 shows the situation for group 9). 
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